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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent,

:

v.

:

JOSEPH MITCHELL PARSONS,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No.

880102

Priority No. 1

:

RESPONDENT'S ANSWER TO PETITION
FOR REHEARING
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an answer to a petition for rehearing in an
appeal from a conviction of Murder in the First Degree, a capital
felony, after a jury verdict imposing a sentence of death in the
Fifth Judicial District Court.

This Court has jurisdiction to

hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(h) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the reasonable doubt jury instruction given

in the penalty phase did not constitute manifest error in light
of this Court's ruling in Tillman that an identical instruction
did not violate due process?
2.

Whether no manifest error or prejudice occurred in

the present case due to the alleged failure of the Iron County
Attorney to file a civil bond statutorily required for his
political office?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 17-16-11 (1987 replacement).
17-16-11.

Official bonds.

The board of county commissioners shall
prescribe by ordinance the amount in which
the following county and precinct officers
shall execute official bonds before entering
upon the discharge of the duties of their
respective offices, viz.: county clerk,
county auditor, sheriff, county attorney,
county recorder, county assessor, county
surveyor, justice of the peace and constable,
and the board may by ordinance require any
deputy or assistant of any such officer to
execute an official bond before entering upon
the discharge of the duties of his office.
The amount in which the county treasurer
shall execute an official bond shall be
prescribed by the state money management
council. If surety company bonds are taken,
the premium for such bonds as the county
commissioners shall specify by ordinance
shall be paid out of the county funds. The
judge or judges of the district court of the
county shall prescribe the amount in which
each member of the board of county
commissioners of the county shall execute an
official bond before entering upon the
discharge of the duties of his office. If
surety company bonds are taken and if the
county commissioners shall so direct by
ordinance the premium for each such bond
shall be paid out of the county funds. The
bonds and sureties of county commissioners
must, before the bonds can be recorded and
filed, be approved by one of said judges.
The bonds and sureties of all other county
and precinct officers must be approved by the
board of county commissioners before such
bonds can be filed and recorded. All persons
offered as sureties on official bonds shall
be examined on oath touching their
qualifications, and no person, other than a
surety company, shall be admitted as surety
on any such bond unless he is a resident and
free holder within this state and is worth in
real or personal property, or both, situate
in this state the amount of his undertaking
over and above all just debts and liabilities
exclusive of property exempt from execution.
All official bonds shall be recorded in the

office of the county recorder and then filed
and kept in the office of the county clerk.
The official bond of the county clerk after
being recorded shall be filed and kept in the
office of the county treasurer.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, was charged with
Murder in the First Degree, a capital felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-202 (Supp. 1987); Aggravated Robbery, a
first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302
(1978); and Theft of an Operable Motor Vehicle, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978) (R. 12).

Defendant pled guilty as charged on September 18, 1987, in

the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County, State
of Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Judge, presiding (R. 7986).

At the penalty phase, defendant was sentenced to death

after a jury trial held January 26, 1988 through January 29, 1988
in the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County,
State of Utah, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Judge, presiding (R.
299, 354-59).

A stay of execution was issued by this Court on

March 18, 1988.
On appeal, this Court affirmed defendant's convictions
and sentence in an opinion filed October 13, 1989 in State v.
Parsons, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (S.Ct. October 13, 1989).
Defendant filed a Petition for Rehearing on December 4, 1989.
This Court invited the State to answer the Petition for Rehearing
on December 14, 1989.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
In this Answer, the State relies on the Statement of
Facts set forth in the Brief of Respondent,

No further facts are

necessary for a determination of the issues now presented to this
Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO MANIFEST ERROR RESULTED FROM THE
REASONABLE DOUBT JURY INSTRUCTION.
In his Petition for Rehearing, defendant notes that
this Court's opinion in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375 (Utah
1989) had not been filed at the time the present case was briefed
and argued.

Defendant points out that this Court questioned a

reasonable doubt instruction in both the Ireland case and in the
capital use of State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987).

He

concludes that Ireland and Tillman are distinguishable from the
present case because he pled guilty and a reasonable doubt
instruction was only used in the penalty phase.
Notably, defendant does not recite the reasonable doubt
instruction utilized in the present case.

Nor does he claim that

manifest error of a constitutional magnitude resulted in the
present case.

Instead, he simply states that the present case is

substantially different from Ireland and Tillman.
This Court has expressed that in a capital case, "this
Court will review errors raised on appeal, even if no proper
objection was made at trial, but will reverse a conviction based

on such errors only if they are 'manifest and prejudicial'"
State v, Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1254 (Utah 1988), aff'd on
reconsideration, 776 P.2d 631 (1989); (Citing State v. Tillman,
750 P.2d 546, 550 (Utah 1987); State v. Norton, 675 P.2d 577, 581
(Utah 1983), cert, denied 466 U.S. 942 (1984); State v. Wood, 648
P.2d 71, 77 (Utah 1982), cert, denied 459 U.S. 988 (1982)).
Assuming that defendant is claiming manifest error, defendant's
claim should be rejected.
The relevant jury instruction in the present case reads
as follows:
Reasonable doubt in the penalty phase
means a doubt that is based on reason and one
which is reasonable in view of all of the
evidence. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
that degree of proof which satisfies the mind
and convinces the understanding of those who
are bound to act conscientiously upon it.
Reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable
men and women would entertain, and it must
arise from your consideration and weighing of
the totality of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, and from the
evidence or lack of evidence in the case.
If, after an impartial consideration and
comparison of all the evidence in the case,
you can candidly say that you are not
persuaded that the death penalty should be
imposed, you have a reasonable doubt. But
if, after such impartial consideration and
comparison of all the evidence, you can
truthfully say that you have been persuaded
so as to have an abiding conviction that the
death penalty is appropriate in this case,
such as you would be willing to act upon in
the more weighty and important matters
relating to your own affairs, you have no
reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt must be

At present, this Court has not enunciated whether a capital
defendant can raise new issues in a petition for rehearing. In
any event, the State will respond to defendant's new issues.
-5-

real, substantial doubt and not one that is
merely possible or imaginary.
(R. 266) (See Addendum "A"; Jury Instruction No. 13).
This court reviewed a similar claim in State v.
Tillman, 250 P.2d at 571-72.

The Tillman instruction read:

Now, by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt
that is based on reason and one which is
reasonable in view of all the evidence.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that
degree of proof which satisfies the mind and
convinces the understanding of those who are
bound to act conscientiously upon it. A
reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable
men and women would entertain, and it must
arise from the evidence or the lack of the
evidence in this case.
If after an impartial consideration and
comparison of all the evidence in the case
you can candidly say that you are not
satisfied of the defendant's guilt, you have
reasonable doubt. But if after
such
impartial
consideration
and comparison of all
the evidence you can truthfully
say that you
have an abiding conviction
of the
defendant's
guilt such as you would be willing
to act
upon in the more weighty and important
matters relating
to your own affairs,
you
have no reasonable doubt.
A reasonable
doubt
must be a real, substantial
doubt and not one
that is merely possible
or imaginary.
Id. at 571-72 (Emphasis in original).

In Tillman, a capital

case, this Court found that the language did not "in any way
alter the State's burden of proof or shift it to defendant." Id.
at 572.

Thus, no error was assigned to the instruction.
Subsequently, in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1380,

this court rejected a claim that an instruction almost identical
to Tillman violated due process. Viewing the Ireland instruction
in context with other instructions detailing the burden of proof
and presumption of innocence, this Court ruled that the
reasonable doubt instruction was not constitutionally defective.
-6-

In a strong dissent, Justice Stewart took issue with
the language of the instruction.
(Stewart, J. Dissenting).

Ireland, 773 P.2d at 1380-82

In particular, he expressed that the

"weighty affairs of life" and "possible or imaginary" language
was inappropriate.

In response to Justice Stewart's concerns,

the majority opinion acknowledged that the dissent's criticisms
were justified.

As a supervisory matter, this court directed

that trial courts discontinue use of the inappropriate language
in reasonable doubt instructions.

At the time of the Ireland

decision, the present case had been briefed, argued, and
submitted.
As set forth above, the reasonable doubt instruction in
the present case was almost identical to the Tillman and Ireland
instructions.

The only distinguishing factor between Tillman and

the present case is that defendant waived the guilt phase of his
trial by his plea of guilty.

The jury was instructed on the

reasonable doubt standard only at the penalty phase.

In light of

this Court's determination in Tillman and Ireland, there is no
compelling reason to find that the reasonable doubt instruction
constituted manifest error in the penalty phase.

The due process

analysis conducted in Ireland is equally applicable to a penalty
phase instruction.
Additionally, this Court in its opinion in the instant
case conducted a review of the jury instructions to determine
whether the jury was misled to the conclusion that it could find
only aggravating circumstances.
21-22.

Parsons, 119 Utah Adv. Rep. at

This Court found that Instructions No's. 12 and 13

_7_

clearly and correctly enunciate the standards to be applied in a
capital penalty phase. 3ji. Also, Instruction No. 18 clearly
states that the burden is upon the State to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the totality of the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the totality of the mitigating
circumstances and that beyond a reasonable doubt the death
penalty is appropriate in the circumstances of this case (R. 273)
(See Addendum "B"; Jury Instruction No. 18).
Considering the instructions as a whole, it cannot be
said that the reasonable doubt instruction misled the jury to
alter or shift the State's burden of proof (R. 279) (See Addendum
"C"; Jury Instruction No. 23 (Instructing the jury "to consider
all the instructions as a whole.")).

Consequently, this Court

should find that the instruction did not constitute manifest and
prejudicial error.
POINT II
IN THE ABSENCE OF RECORD SUPPORT, THIS COURT
SHOULD REJECT DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT MANIFEST
ERROR RESULTED BY THE IRON COUNTY ATTORNEY'S
ALLEGED FAILURE TO EXECUTE A SURETY BOND
PRIOR TO TAKING POLITICAL OFFICE.
On rehearing, defendant raises the claim that the Iron
County Attorney failed to execute an official bond before
entering upon the discharge of the duties of his office as
required by Utah Code Ann. § 17-16-11 (L987 replacement) (See
Addendum "D"; Statute).

He claims that without a surety bond,

the County Attorney could not sign the information charging
defendant's crime.

He concludes that the District Court lacked

jurisdiction without a valid information.
should be rejected.

Defendant's claim

As stated earlier, this Court will review an
unpreserved claim in capital cases but will reverse only if it is
"manifest and prejudicial."

State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1254.

It is axiomatic, however, that with "no claim of prejudice and
nothing in the record to substantiate any harm or error, [this
Court] can only conclude that [a] defendant's claim of
irregularity is without merit."

State v. Parsons, 119 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 24.
In the instant case, there is no record support for
defendant's claim that the Iron County Attorney failed to execute
an official bond.

Neither is there record evidence of any

prejudice that could have resulted from such a collateral and
insubstantial failure.

See Utah R. Crim. P. 30(a) (Any error,

defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the
substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded).

In the

absence of record support for defendant's claim of error and
prejudice, this Court should conclude that defendant's claim is
without merit.
DATED thLsc^O——day

of December, 1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAN R. LARSEN
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the
foregoing Respondent's Answer to Petition for Rehearing, was
mailed, postage prepaid, to James L. Shumate, attorney for
appellant, P.O. Box 623, Cedar City, Utah
of January, 1990.
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Reasonable doubt in the penalty phase means a doubt that is
based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of all of the
evidence.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of

proof which satisfies the mind and convinces the understanding of
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it.

Reasonable

doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain,
and it must arise from your consideration and weighing of the
totality of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and
from the evidence or lack of evidence in the case.
If, after an impartial consideration and comparison of all
the evidence in the case, you can candidly say that you are not
persuaded that the death penalty should be imposed, you have a
reasonable doubt.

But if, after such impartial consideration and

comparison of all the evidence, you can truthfully say that you
have been persuaded so as to have an abiding conviction that the
death penalty is appropriate in this case, such as you would be
willing to act upon in the more weighty and important matters
relating to your own affairs, you have no reasonable doubt.

A

reasonable doubt must be real, substantial doubt and not one that
is merely possible or imaginary.

ADDENDUM B

INSTRUCTION N O . _ / S

I have previously instructed you that the State has the
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the totality of
the aggravating circumstances outweighs the totality of the
mitigating circumstances in this case and that, beyond a reasonable
doubt, the imposition of the death penalty is justified and
appropriate in the circumstances of this case.

You must find that

the State has met its burden before you may impose the death
penalty in this case.
As an aggravating cixcumstance in addition to those upon
which I have previously instructed you, the State has produced
evidence that the defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, committed
the crime of being a person on parole in possession of a firearm
in violation of the law of this State.

Before you may consider

evidence that the defendant possessed a firearm before, during or
after he admittedly caused the death of Richard L. Ernest, you
must find beyond a reasonable doubt, that each and every one of
the following elements has been proven by the evidence:
1.

That the offense, if any, occurred in the State of Utah,

2.

That the offense, if any, occurred on or about August

31, 1987, although the exact date is immaterial,
3.

That the defendant, Joseph Mitchell Parosn, was on

parole for a felony,

i*73

4. That the defendant, knowingly had in his possession or
under his custody or control,
5. A firearm.
You are instructed that the »38 caliber pistol located in
the glove compartment of the 1906 Dodge Omni is in fact a firearm.
If you find that each and every element stated has been
proven by the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
may consider the possession of the firearm by the defendant as
an aggravating circumstance.
If you find that one or more of these elements has not been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you may not consider the
presence of the firearm in the vehicle for any purpose and you
are hereby instructed, in that case, to ignore and disregard the
evidence presented regarding the firearm.
A special verdict question will be given so you can
state you findings on this question.

ADDENDUM C

INSTRUCTION NO,

£3

If in these Instructions any rule, direction or idea be
stated in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended by me and
none should be inferred by you.

For that reason, you are not to

single out any certain sentence or any individual point or
instruction and ignore the others but you are to consider all the
instructions as a whole and are to regard each in the light of all
the others.
The order in which the instructions are given has no
significance as to their relative importance.

ADDENDUM D

17-16-11. Official bonds.
The board of county commissioners shall prescribe by ordinance the amount
in which the following county and precinct officers shall execute official bonds
before entering upon the discharge of the duties of their respective offices, viz.:
county clerk, county auditor, sheriff, county attorney, county recorder, county
assessor, county surveyor, justice of the peace and constable, and the board
may by ordinance require any deputy or assistant of any such officer to execute an official bond before entering upon the discharge of the duties of his
office. The amount in which the county treasurer shall execute an official
bond shall be prescribed by the state money management council. If surety
company bonds are taken, the premium for such of the bonds as the county
commissioners shall specify by ordinance shall be paid out of the county funds.
The judge or judges of the district court of the county shall prescribe the
amount in which each member of the board of county commissioners of the
county shall execute an official bond before entering upon the discharge of the
duties of his office. If surety company bonds are taken and if the coimty
commissioners shall so direct by ordinance the premium for each such bond
shall be paid out of the county funds. The bonds and sureties of county commissioners must, before the bonds can be recorded and filed, be approved by
one of said judges. The bonds and sureties of all other county and precinct
officers must be approved by the board of county commissioners before such
bonds can be filed and recorded. All persons offered as sureties on official
bonds shall be examined on oath touching their qualifications, and no person,
other than a surety company, shall be admitted as surety on any such bond
unless he is a resident and freeholder within this state and is worth in real or
personal property, or both, situate in this state the amount of his undertaking
over and above all just debts and liabilities exclusive of property exempt from
406

